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Sanford Aranoff
Wed Jun 01 2011, 05:14PM
Guest
The Republicians under Lincoln campaigned for abolution. Suppose the effort were different. Let slavery continue. Just focus on two evils. Make laws that families cannot be broken up; parents and young children must be together. No serious physical punishment. Instead of trying to change things that Pres. Washington, do things gradually. This is what Newt G. said about health care.
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gpthelastrebel
Wed Jun 01 2011, 06:16PM

Registered Member #1
Joined: Tue Jul 17 2007, 10:46AM
Posts: 3400
Mr. Arnoff,

Thank you for visiting and your comments. May I also suggest you visit our "Negroes In Gray" website found under other websites in the menu

In reality the slavery issue was settled when the first four states left the Union. These four states could have been left alone and slavery would have died a natural death. With Lincoln's invasion of the South, it forced the other nine states to join the Confederacy. This was the real cause of the war not slavery.

It is my understanding, and I do not claim to be an expert, that the United states is the only country that settled the issue of slavery by war.

GP
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Lady Val
Sat Jun 11 2011, 08:02AM
Registered Member #75
Joined: Sat Nov 01 2008, 11:22AM
Posts: 475
Had slavery been the cause of secession - because secession was certainly the cause of the war - then there would have been neither secession nor war. By the time of Lincoln's inauguration, the proposed original 13th Amendment to the Constitution (the Corwin Amendment) had passed both Houses of Congress, been ratified by one state and signed by President Buchanan (unnecessary, but an example of the popularity of the amendment). The Corwin Amendment enshrined slavery in the Constitution in perpetuity; that is, it could not later be revoked. Ergo, the South had clear and eternal protection for their "peculiar institution." Obviously, if slavery had been the problem, those states already "out," South Carolina, Georgia and Florida I believe, would have simply returned and all would have proceeded as before except that the noisy and (on the whole) despised radical abolitionists would have had to go somewhere else to make trouble.

But that didn't happen. The Southern states departed because they were being (or had already been) changed from participating members of a republic into an economic colony of the rest of the Union whose money (the South paid 80% of the federal revenues) was being used for the benefit of Northern commercial and political interests. Seeing nothing ahead but political irrelevancy and a subject status in the nation, the Southern people by and large decided to leave the old compact and set up a new one as was their guaranteed right under the Constitution.

And, by the way, Lincoln NEVER campaigned for abolition. Indeed, he said that he had neither the right nor the desire to "interfere" with slavery. His entire campaign was one for high tariffs and "the American System" of corporate welfare.

[ Edited Sat Jun 11 2011, 08:04AM ]
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gpthelastrebel
Sat Jun 11 2011, 11:20AM

Registered Member #1
Joined: Tue Jul 17 2007, 10:46AM
Posts: 3400
Val,

Thanks for expanding on my post. Good info.

GP
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gpthelastrebel
Sun Jun 30 2013, 08:16AM

Registered Member #1
Joined: Tue Jul 17 2007, 10:46AM
Posts: 3400
Buchanan for Arbitration, Lincoln for War

President Buchanan was keenly aware that he had no constitutional means to stop a State from withdrawing from the Union, and could command no military force to do so. Lincoln’s use of force was enabled by Republican governors who put armed force at his disposal and with which to wage war. The author below cites Buchanan’s careful analysis of the powers of the three branches of government, legislative, executive, and judicial, that this “could perhaps be called the valedictory of the first seventy years of constitutional government in the United States.” Buchanan’s real concern with preserving of the Union resided in attempts at arbitration, and fundamental to any understanding of Buchanan’s policy is his clear concept of the rights of a minority group in a republican form of government.

Bernhard Thuersam, Chairman
North Carolina War Between the States Sesquicentennial Commission
www.ncwbts150.com
"The Official Website of the North Carolina WBTS Sesquicentennial"


Buchanan for Arbitration, Lincoln for War

“[There] is good reason to believe that President James Buchanan, as well as many other leaders, expected to avoid open conflict. The mood of the country had sobered at the realization that a sectional party had elected a president. Public opinion, in general, was entirely remote from the thought of war. Forty years of public service, in both houses of Congress, in the cabinet, and in the courts of Europe, suggested arbitration of the crisis to Buchanan. War he believed, “ought to be the last desperate remedy of a despairing people, after every other constitutional means of conciliation had been exhausted.”

Buchanan remained firm in his conviction that “justice as well as sound policy requires us still to seek a peaceful solution.” If the tall shadow of the president-elect [Lincoln] lay across every discussion, then it will be remembered that Lincoln remained, during this period, a shadow indeed, without a voice of assurance or warning.

Buchanan’s conciliatory stand has, until recently, been buried under the avalanche of post-war attitudes which show him only as the inept and weak man who stepped down for Lincoln’s administration. An able scholar. . . Professor James G. Randall, comments succinctly, “If . . . preservation of the Union by peaceable adjustment was possible, then unionists were not faced with a choice of war or disunion, but rather a choice between a Union policy of war and a Union policy in the Virginia sense of adjustment and concession.”

Especially suggestive to students of the period is Randall’s recent statement that “the wars that have not happened” should be studied. Judged in the light of “historical relativity” rather than in the concept of the “irrepressible conflict,” Buchanan’s policy, particularly as outlined in his December 3rd [1860] address to the nation, is subject to fresh interpretation.

[President Buchanan’s] course was, rather, that of a man trained in a political school of compromise, whose viewpoint was shaped by his legalistic interpretation of the executive power as it was limited by the Constitution. Summarizing the President’s careful exposition of this stand, [biographer George Ticknor] Curtis concluded with him that, “To the Executive Department it appropriately belonged to suggest the measures of conciliation. . . But the Executive could not in the smallest degree increase the means which existing laws had placed in his hands.”

The concept of “historical relativity” was at the core of the defense offered by Buchanan’s most recent biographer, Philip Gerald Auchampaugh, who, in 1926, openly attacked the “staff of arm-chair Generals of History Departments who, for the most part, have taken up their pens for the winning side”. . . . .

His brief for Buchanan’s policy is unqualified and specific:

“His main aim, to give things a peaceful direction, and prevent the opening of a terrible “Brother’s War,” had been accomplished midst terrific difficulties. No stone had been left unturned to promote measures of compromise that would be fair to all concerned. The President had also escaped the pitfalls of the Republicans, by standing firmly on his constitutional prerogatives, both in dealing with Congress and the Southern States.”

Edward Channing pointed out that Buchanan had no power, “either constitutional or material,” to use coercive measures and suggested that, especially in view of the small military force at his disposal, “If he had wished to coerce the South or any individual within its boundaries, it is difficult to see how he could do so.”

Randall discounts the theory of the “irrepressible conflict,” recognizes the President’s dilemma in its implications for that time, and appraises the long-term validity of compromise and conciliation. Assessing the terrific losses on both sides of the conflict, from war to reconstruction, he suggests “a fuller measure of democracy would probably have prevented the war or at least have mitigated its abuses.” Backed by the accumulating mass of evidence, he states with conviction that “There is little doubt that at the moment the majority of the American people wished for conciliation to be tried.”

“Time is a great conservative power. Let us pause at this momentous point and afford the people, both North and South, an opportunity for reflection,” said Buchanan on January 8, 1861. This strategy was also within the framework of a tradition, which had, as in the case of the [New England’s 1814] Hartford Convention, seen active resistance and threat of secession avoided with time as a moderating force. In modern terms, Buchanan might be said to have viewed secession as sort of a “sit-down strike,” to be solved by arbitration rather than by force.

Facts and events were, in truth, shaping the destiny of the plantation system and, as Arnold Toynbee has suggested, were tending to outlaw slavery. Already the slave system in the United States, as a labor supply, was in competition with the ever-growing tide of immigrant labor in the factories of New England.

Geographic boundaries were being set quite as much by the advance of the free farming frontier. . . . these factors suggest that Buchanan’s strategy of time, perhaps even a delay of ten years, might have avoided the war. He was not unaware that a precedent for the peaceful solution of the complex problem of emancipation had been set by England in 1833.

With war as an easy alternative, the eventful one hundred and fifty days before [Fort] Sumter offered a fertile field for study of the technique of arbitration, for here the uncertain balance between compromise and conflict was maintained. . . . his conviction that the Union could not be cemented by the blood of its citizens, it is difficult to see how Buchanan could have chosen another course.”

(James Buchanan and the Crisis of the Union, Frank Wysor Klingberg, Journal of Southern of Southern History, Vol. IX, Number 4, November 1943, pp. 455-457, 459, 466-468, 470-474)


(Used With Permission)
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gpthelastrebel
Fri Aug 23 2013, 09:14AM

Registered Member #1
Joined: Tue Jul 17 2007, 10:46AM
Posts: 3400
Mediation to Avoid War


Rudolf Schleiden, Hanseatic States representative at Washington in 1861, was earnestly interested in averting war between North and South and offered to mediate the crisis. He had approached Lincoln even before his inauguration to authorize peaceful negotiation with the South to avoid bloodshed, but to no avail.

Bernhard Thuersam, Chairman
North Carolina War Between the States Sesquicentennial Commission
"Unsurpassed Valor, Courage and Devotion to Liberty"
www.ncwbts150.com
"The Official Website of the North Carolina WBTS Sesquicentennial"


Mediation to Avoid War

“To avert civil war and the consequent disruption of trade seemed to Schleiden a foremost duty. He became then, an earnest advocate of mediation. . . and offered his services to [Secretary of State William] Seward in the hope that he alone might be able to negotiate an armistice which would maintain a peaceful status until Congress could assemble. [Lincoln told him that] “he did not have in mind any aggression against the Southern States, but merely the safety of the Government in the capital and the possibility to govern everywhere.”

On the evening of April 24 Schleiden departed secretly for Richmond . . . [and immediately wrote] to Vice President [Alexander H.] Stephens asking for an interview, to which the latter replied that he would be happy to see him immediately. “The actions of Seward and Lincoln had filled the South with suspicion,” Stephens said, “but neither the Government at Montgomery not the authorities of Virginia contemplated an attack on Washington.”

He added . . . “Public opinion was embittered against the United States because of the strengthening of Forts Pickens and Fort Monroe, and the destruction of the arsenal at Harper’s Ferry, and navy yard at Norfolk.” In view of these facts Stephens favored a “de facto truce through tactful avoidance of an attack by both sides,” rather than a formal armistice.

In a formal letter, written after the conference, Schleiden asked for a frank statement of the terms which the South would be ready to grant and accept for the purpose of securing the maintenance of peace and gaining time for reflection. “I believe that your complying with my above request,” wrote Schleiden, “offers the last prospect for attaining a peaceful solution of the present crisis.”

To this letter Stephens replied, stating that the Government of the Confederacy had resorted to every honorable means to avoid war, and that if the United States had any desire to adjust amicably the questions at issue it should indicate its willingness by some authoritative way to the South.

However, he added, referring to the United States, “it seems their policy to wage war for the recapture of former possessions looking to the ultimate coercion and subjugation of the people of the Confederate States to their power and domain. With such an object on their part persevered in, no power on earth can arrest or prevent a most bloody conflict.”

After the last conference with Stephens, Schleiden returned to Washington, reaching the Capital on the afternoon of the 27th. Immediately upon his arrival he addressed a letter to President Lincoln, inclosing is correspondence with Stephens. After stating that the Southern States were arming in self defense, he reported that if the South were assured the President would recommend to Congress when it assembles on July 4 a speedy and amicable adjustment of the differences and the propriety of treating with commissioners of the Southern States, there would be not any danger of a conflict.

At the request of the President, Seward replied to this letter in an informal and unofficial communication from the Department of State. Seward informed Schleiden that Lincoln was of the opinion that a continuance of the negotiations would be without beneficial result.

In view of this fact, Schleiden wrote to Stephen’s: “It is only now and with deep regret that I can inform you that my attempt at contributing toward gaining time for reflection and if possible a favorable adjustment of the existing differences has failed.”

Finally, on May 2, 1861, Schleiden wrote to his Government: “I regret to report to the honorable Senate committee that my attempts to mediate a truce and thereby furnish the opposing parties time for quiet reflection has not been successful.”

Schleiden [later] reported in a dispatch that Lincoln had said to Judge Thomas of Massachusetts in mid-1864 that he would be satisfied if his successor, as he was despondent of his reelection chances, was elected from the Republican party. If that was not the case, he feared he would spend the rest of his life in jail for repeated violations of the Constitution.”

(Rudolf Schleiden and the Visit to Richmond, April 25, 1861, Ralph Haswell Lutz, Annual Report of the American Historical Association for 1915, Smithsonian Institution, 1917, pp. 210-216)


(Used With Permissio)
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gpthelastrebel
Tue Feb 12 2019, 12:47PM

Registered Member #1
Joined: Tue Jul 17 2007, 10:46AM
Posts: 3400

Attorney General Black’s Opinion of November 20, 1860:

“Whether Congress has the constitutional right to make war upon one or more States, , and require the Executive of the Federal Government to carry it on by means of force to be drawn from the other States, is a question for Congress itself to consider.

It must be admitted that no such power is expressly given; nor are there any words in the Constitution which imply it. Among the powers enumerated in Article 1, Section 8, [it] certainly means nothing more than the power to commence and carry on hostilities against the foreign enemies of the nation.

Another clause, in the same section gives Congress the power “to provide for calling forth the militia,” and to use them within the limits of the State. But this power is also restricted by the words which immediately follow that it can be exercised only for one of the following purposes: To execute the laws of the Union;….To suppress insurrections against the State; but this is confined by Article 4, Section 4, to cases in which the State itself shall apply for assistance against her own people.

[And] 3. To repel the invasion of a State by enemies who come from abroad to assail her in her own territory. All these provisions are made to protect the States, not to authorize an attack by one part of the country by another; to preserve the peace, and not to plunge them into civil war. Our forefathers do not seem to have thought that war was calculated “to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.”

There was undoubtedly a strong and universal conviction among the men who framed and ratified the Constitution, that military force would not only be useless, but pernicious, as a means of holding the States together.

If it is true that war cannot be declared, nor a system of general hostilities carried on by the Central Government against a State, then it seems to follow that an attempt to do so would be ipso facto an expulsion of such State from the Union. Being treated as an alien and enemy, she would be compelled to act accordingly.

And if Congress shall break up the present Union by unconstitutionally putting strife and enmity and armed hostility between different sections of the country, instead of the domestic tranquility which the Constitution was meant to insure, will not all the States be absolved from their Federal obligations?”

(Twenty Years of Congress, James G. Blaine, Volume I, Henry Hill Publishing Company, 1884, pp. 604-605)
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