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Author Post
gpthelastrebel
Thu Jun 22 2017, 03:04PM

Registered Member #1
Joined: Tue Jul 17 2007, 02:46PM
Posts: 3698
This thread is posted for the purpose of holding it as I do more research. Be sure to verify any info that you decide to use.

GP
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http://history-sites.com/cgi-bin/bbs53x/nvcwmb/webbbs_config.pl?read=61506


SAN ANTONIO, December 13, 1860.
Lient. Gen. W. SCOTT, Gommanding U. S. Army, New York:
GENERAL: I think there can be no doubt that many of the Southern
States will secede from the Union. The State of Texas will be among
the number, and, from all appearances at present, it will be at an early
day, certainly before the 4th of March next. What is to be done with
public property in charge of’ the Army? The arsenal at this place has
some ordnance and other munitions of war. I do not expect an order
for the present for the disposition of them, but I would be pleased to
receive your views and suggestions. My course as respects myself will
be to remain at my post and protect this frontier as long as I can, and
then, when turned adrift, make my way home, if I have one. I would
be pleased to hear from you at your earliest convenience.

I am, general, with sentiments of respect and regard, yours, &c.,
D. E. TWIGGS.

***************************
WASHINGTON, December 28, 1860.
Maj. Gen. D. E. TwIGGS:

My DEAR GENERAL: The General-in-Chief himself laboring for the
time under an attack of sickness, desires me to acknowledge and thank
you for your letter of the 13th instant, the spirit of which he highly
approves. He says you will understand its reminding him vividly of
the interviexv he had with you in Angusta in 1832.

In cases of political disturbance, involving local conflict with the
authority of the General Government, the General-in-Chief considers
that the military questions, snch as you snggest, contain a political ele-
ment, with due regard to which, and in due deference to the chief exec-
utive anthority, no extraordinary instructions concerning them must be
issued without the consent of such authority.

He has labored hard in suggesting and urging proper measures to
vindicate the laws and protect the property of the United States with-
ont waging war or acting offensively against any State or community.
All such snggestions, though long since made in good time to have
been peaceably and efficiently carried out, have failed to secure the fav-
orable attention of the Government.

The President has listened to him with due friendliness and respect,
but the War Department has been little communicative. Up to this
time he has not been shown the written instructions of Major Anderson,
nor been informed of the purport of those more recently conveyed to Fort
Moultrie verbally by Major Buell.

Probably the policy of the Government in regard to the forts and
depots within the limits of seceding States will have been clearly indi-
cated before events can have caused a practical issue to be made up in
Texas.

The General does not see at this moment that he can tender you any
special advice, but leaves the administration of your command in your
own hands, with the laws and regulations to guide, in the full confidence
that your discretion, firmness, and patriotism will effect all of good that
the sad state of the times may permit. He adds his best wishes for
your health and happiness; which are cordially shared by
Yours, very truly and respectfully,

GEORGE W. LAY.

***********************************

THE STATE OF TEXAS, County of Travis:

By virtue of the authority vested in the committee of public safety,
as will appear by the accompanying resolutions, adopted by the Con-
vention of the People of the State of Texas, by their delegates in Con-
vention assembled, at the city of Austin, on the 28th day of January,
1861, you, Thomas J. Devine, Samuel A. Maverick, P. N. Luckett, and
J. II. Rogers, are hereby appointed commissioners to visit Major-Gen-
eral Twiggs, commanding the Eighth Division, stationed at San Antonio,
and confer with him, and in the name and by the authority of the peo-
ple of Texas, in Convention assembled, to demand, receive, and receipt
S. A. MAVERWK, P. N. LUcKETT,

Commssioners on behalf of the Gonvention of the People of Texas.
for all military, medical, commissary, and ordnance stores, arms, muni—
tions of war, and public moneys, &c., nnder his control, within the
limits of the State of Texas, exercising all due discretion for the securing
and safe-keeping of the same, to be held by you without loss or injury,
subject to the orders of the committee of public safety, and in obedience
to the provisions of such rules as the Convention may prescribe.
Witness my hand and the order of the committee of safety. iDone at
the city of Austin, this 5th day of Febi-nary, 1861.

JOHN C. ROBERTSON,
Chairman of Committee of Public Safety.
Attest:
Tuos. S. LITBEOCK.
JOHN A. GREEN.

[Inclosuro No. 5.]
Resolved, By the People of the State of Texas, by delegates in Conven.
tion assembled, That should the standing committee of public safety
deem it essential to the public safety to appoint commissioners officers,
or persons, in reference to taking possession of any of the Federal prop-
erty within the limits of this State, they shall have power to appoint
such, and assign to them their duties, and give them the instructions
under which they shall act; but this power shall only extend to such
cases in which the committee may deem prompt action and secrecy
absolutely necessary.

That a copy of this resolution, signed by the president of this Conven-
tion, arid the appointment and instructions signed by the Hon. J. C.
Robertson, chairman of said committee, shall be frill authority to the
person or persons acting under the same, and a full justification for all
acts done in pursuance thereof.

Done by the People of Texas, in Convention assembled, by their dele-
gates, at the city of Austin, this 2d February, A. ID. 1861
0. M. ROBERTS,
President of the Convention.
Attest:
JOHN A. GREEN.
[Inclosure No. 6.]
Resolved That Samuel A. Maverick, Thomas J. Devine, Philip N.
Luckett, and James H. Rogers be appointed commissioners to confer
with General D. E. Twiggs with regard to the public arms, stores,
munitions of war, &c., under his control, and belonging to the United
States, with power to demand in the name of the People of the State of
Texas, and that said commissioners be clothed with full power to carry
into effect the powers herein delegated, and retain possession of said
tirms, munitions, stores, &c., subject to the order of the Convention of
the People of the State of Texas, and report their acts and doings in the
premises to the committee of public safety.

I certify the foregoing to be a trne copy of the resolution adopted by
the committee of public safety on the 4th day of February, 1861.
Witness my hand, this 4th day of February, A. ID. 1861.
JOHN C. ROBERTSON,
Chairman of Committee of Public Safety.
Attest:
THOS. S. LUBBOCK.
JOHN A. GREEN.

***************************************

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF TEXAS,
San Antonio, February 17, 1861.
GENTLEMEN: In reply to your communication of this date, I have to
say that you are already aware of my views in regard to the delivery of
the public property of this department, and I now repeat tliat I will
direct the positions held by the Federal troops to be turned over to the
authorized agents of the State of Texas, provided the troops retain their
arms and clothing, camp and garrison equipage, quartermaster’s stores,
subsistence, medical, hospital stores, and such means of transportation
of every kind as may be necessary for an efficient and orderly movement
of the troops from Texas, prepared for attack or defense against aggres-
smon from any source.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
D. E. TWJGGS,
Brevet Major- General, U. S. Army, C1omdg. Dept.
Messrs. Tilos. J. DEVINE,
S. A. MAVERICK,
P. N. LUCKETT,
Commissioners on behalf of the Convention of the People of Texas.
[Inclosure No. 12.1
SAN ANTONIO, February 17, 1861.
SIR: in reply to your communication of this date, we have to say that
we accept the terms therein set forth, with the conditions stated in our
note of the 14th instant, viz, that the troops shall leave Texas by the
way of the coast, afid, upon arriving at the point or points of embarka-
tion, xvill deliver np to the authorized agents, appointed for that pur-
pose, all means of transportation of every kind used by them, as like-
wise the artillery, if any be taken.
Respectfully, &c., THOS. ~. DEYIINE,
S. A. MAVERICK,
P. N. LUCKETT,
Commissioners on behalf of the Committee of Public Safety.

**********************************
Bvt. Maj. Gen. DAVID E. TWIGGS, U. S. Army,
Gommanding Department of Texas.
HEADQUARTERS DEPART~IENT OF TEXAS,
San Antonio, February iS, 1861.
GENTL~rE~: Your ominnnication of the 17th instant, which you
say is a reply to mine wiitten yesterday, the 17th instant, was received
last night. I consent to th~e conditions that the troops shall le~1ve Texas
by the way of the coast, with the provision expressed in my cornmuni-
cation of yesterday.
As to the condition of surren(lering the guns of the light batteries,
that, you must see, would be an act which would cast a lasting disgrace
upon the arms of the United States, and nnder no circumstances can I
believe that the State of Texas would demand such a sacrifice at my
hands, and more particularly so, after 1 have yielded so much to meet
what I deemed to be due to the State and to avoid any unnecessary
collision between the Federal and State troops. In this view of the
case, I am sure you will not insist in a demand which, you must see, I
am not at liberty to grant.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
D. E. TWIGGS,
Brevet Major- General, U. S. Army, Coindg. Dept.
Messrs. Trios. J. DEVINE,
S. A. MAVEnIcK,
P. N. LUCKETT,
Commissioners on behalf of the Conrention of the People of Texas.
[Inclosure No. 14.]
SAN ANTONJO~ February 18, 1861.
Sir: In reply to your communication of this date, we have to say
that we accept the terms therein stated, viz, that the two batteries of
light artillery, with the arms for the infantry and cavalry, shall be
retained by the troops under your command; all other public property,
as set forth in our previous communication, to be delivered up to agents
authorized to receive it.
We remain, respectfully, your obedient servants,
THOS. J. DEVINE,
P. N. LUCKETT,
S. A. MAVEIRICK,
Commissioners on behalf of Corn ittee of Public Safety
******************************

Bvt Maj. Gen. DAVID E. TwJGGS, U. S. Army
Commanding Department of Texas.
~Thc1osure No. 15.]
GENERAL ORDERS, ~ HDQRS. DEPARTMENT O~~’ TEXAS,
No. 5. San Antonio, February 18, 1861.
The State of Texas having demanded, through its commissioners,
the delivery of the military posts and public property within the limits
of this command, and the commanding general desiring to avoid even
the possibility of a collisioii between the Federal and State troops, the
posts will be evacuated by their garrisons, and these will take up, as
soon as the necessary preparations can be made, the line of march out
of Texas by way of the coast, marching out with their arms (the light
batteries with their guns), clothing, camp and garrison equipage, quar-
~ stores, subsistence, medical, hospital stores, and such means
of transportation of every kind as may be neessary for an efficient and
orderly movement of the troops, prepared for attack or defense against
aggressions from any source.
The troops will carry with them provisions as far as the coast.
By order of Brevet Major-General Twiggs:
W. A. NICHOLS,
Assistant Adjutant- General.
(Inclosure No. 16.]
CIRCULAR.] SAN ANTONIO, February 18, 1861.
The nndersigned, commissioners on the part of the State of Texas,
fully empowered to exercise the authority undertaken by them, have
formally and solemnly agreed with Bvt. Maj. Gen. David E. Twiggs,
U. S. Army, commanding the Department of Texas, that the troops of
the United States shall leave the soil of the State by the way of the
coast; that they shall take with them the arms of the respective corps,
including the battery of light artillery at Fort Duncan and the battery
of the same character at Fort Brown, and shall be allowed the necessary
means for regular and comfortable movement, provisions, tents, &c.,
and transportation.

It is the desire of the commission that there shall be no infraction of
this agreement on the part of the people of the State. It is their wish,
on the contrary, that every facility shall be afforded the troops. They
are our friends. They have heretofore afforded to our people all the
protection in their power, and we owe them every consideration.

The public property at the various posts, other than that above recited
for the use of the troops, will be turned over to agents to be appointed
by the commission, who will give due and proper receipts for the whole
to the officers of the Army whom they relieve from the custody of the
public property. THOS. J. DEVINE,
P. N. LUCKETT,
S. A. MAVERICK
Commissioners on behalf of Committee of Public s~4afety.
http://history-sites.com/cgi-bin/bbs53x/nvcwmb/webbbs_config.pl?read=61508
**************************************

WAn DEPARTMENT, C. S. A.,
Montgomery, March 21, 1861.
HENRY P. BREWSTER:
Sin: You are directed to proceed to the State of Texas and ascertain
from the proper authorities of that State what portion of the property,
arms, and munitions of war appertaining to the Army of the United
States, recently stationed in that State, they may be desirous to turn
over to this Government and make chargeable to it. Being advised
upon this point, you will at once receive into your possession all such
property, arms, &c., and execute to such persons as the State may desig-
nate a receipt for the same; the value of such property to be hereafter
determined between the State of Texas and this Government, or this
Government and that of the United States, as the case may be.

You will from time to time, as such property, arms, &c., may be
turned over, make report to this Department of the character, quality,
and condition of the same, and the disposition made thereof nuder the
directions herein given, with such recommendations and suggestions in
reference to the same as may occur to you. You will provide for the
safe-keeping of such property, arms, &c., either at the places where
they may be delivered, or have them transported to places where this
can be provided with greater economy an(l safety, or to such points as
may hereafter be designated by this Department. You are authorized
to make contracts for the transportation contemplated in these instruc-
tions, and also for the safe-keeping of said property, arms, &c. Such
of the property turned over, strictly perishable in its nature, as may
have been condemned, or as may be, or be considered to be, unfit for
use, or as may be liable to deterioration before it can be applied to use,
may be disposed of as you deem best, provided that the authorities of
Texas shall agree to receive the proceeds of sale, should a sale be made,
and to discharge this Government from liability for the same beyond
the amount for which it may be sold; but you are required at once to
report to this Department the fact of any such disposition of property,
with the reasons which induced it. You are authorized to employ such
clerical assistance as you may require in making the returns contem-
plated herein, paying therefor a reasonable compensation.

After you shall have determined your route in visiting the several
forts and depots, you will report such route to this Department, mdi-
eating at the same time the most convenient channel for communicating
with you, as it may become necessary, from time to time.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
L. P. WALKER,
Secretary of War.

***************************************************************
The State of South Carolina, by the Convention of the People of the said
State, to Robert W. Baruwell, James H. Adams, and James L.Orr:
Whereas the Convention of the People of the State of South Carolina,
begun and holden at Columbia on the seventeenth day of December, in
the year of oar Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty, and thence
continued by adjournment to Charleston, did, by resolution, order “That
three Commissioners, to be elected by ballot of the Convention, be di-
rected forthwith to proceed to Washington, anthorized and empowered
to treat with the Government of the United States for the delivery of
the forts, magazines, light-houses, and other real estate, with their ap-
purtenances, withiu the limits of South Carolina; and also for an appor-
tionment of the public debt and for a division of all other property held
by the Government of the United States as agent of the confederated
States, of which South Carolina was recently a member; and, generally,
to negotiate as to all other measures and arrangements proper to be made
and adopted in the existing relations of the parties, and for the contin-
uance of peace and amity between this Commonwealth and the Govern-
ment at Washington”;

And whereas the said Convention did, by ballot, elect. you to the said
office of Commissioners to the Government at Washington:
Now, be it known that the said Convention, by these presents, doth
commission you, Robert W. Baruwell, James H. Adams, and James L.
Orr, as Commissioners to the Government at Washington, to have, to
hold, and to exercise the said office, with all the powers, rights, and
privileges conferred upon the same by the terms of the resolution herein
cited.

Given under the seal of the State, at Charleston, the twenty-second
day of December, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred
and sixty.
[L. S.] D. F. JAMISON,
President.
iSAAC H. MEANS,
Secretary of State.
Attest:
B. F. ARTHUR,
Clerk of the Convention.
----------------------
[President BUCHANAN writes]
In my message of the 3d of December instant I stated, in regard to the property of the United States in South Carolina, that it “has been purchased for a fair equivalent, ‘by the consent of the legislature of the State, for the erec-
tion of forts, magazines, arsenals,’ &c., and over these the authority ‘to
exercise exclusive legislation’ has been expressly granted by the Con-
stitution to Congress. It is not believed that any attempt will be made
to expel the United States from this property by force; but if in this
I should prove to be mistaken, the officer in command of the forts has
received orders to act strictly on the defensive. In such a contingency
the responsibility for consequences would rightfully rest upon the heads
of the assailants.”

This being the condition of the parties on Saturday, December 8,
four ofthe Representatives from South Carolina called upon me and re-
quested an interview. We had an earnest conversation on the subject.
of these forts and the best means of preventing a collision between the
parties, for the purpose of sparing the effusion of blood. I suggested,
for prudential reasons, that it would be best to put in writing what they
said to me verbally. They did so accordingly, and on Monday morning,
the 10th instant, three of them presented to me a paper signed by all
the Representatives of South Carolina, with a single exception, of which
the following is a copy:

WASHINGTON, December 9, 1860.
His Excellency JAMES BUCHANAN,
President of the United States:
In compliance with our statement to you yesterday, we now express to you onr
strong coavictions that neither the constituted authorities, nor any body of the people of the State of South Carolina, will either attack or molest the United States forts in the harbor of Charleston previously to the action of the convention, and we hope and believe not until an offer has been made, through an accredited representative, to negotiate for an amicable arrangement of all matters between the State and Federal Government, provided that no rc-enforcements shall be sent into those forts, and their
relative military status shall remain as at present.
JOHN McQUEEN.
WM. PORCHER MILES.
M. L. BONHAM.
W. W. BOYCE.
LAWRENCE M. KEITT.

And here I must, in justice to myself, remark that at the time the
paper was presented to me I objected to the word “provided,” as it might
be construed into an agreement on my part which I never would make.
They said nothing was further from their intention; they did not so under-
stand it, and I should not so consider it. It is evident they could enter
into no reciprocal agreement with me on the subject. They did not
profess to have authority to do this, and were acting in their individual
character. I considered it as nothing more in effect than the promise
of highly honorable gentlemen to exert their influence for the purpose
expressed. The event has proven that they have faithfully kept this
promise, although I have never since received a line from any one of them,
or from the convention, on the subject. It is well known that it was my
determination, and this I freely expressed, not to re-enforce the forts in
the harbor, and thus produce a collision,until they had been actually
attacked, or until I had certain evidence that they were about to be at-
tacked. This paper I received most cordially, and considered it as a
happy omen that peace might be still preserved, and that time might
thus be gained for reflection. This is the whole foundation for the
alleged pledge. But I acted in the same manner as I would have done had I entered into a positive and formal agreement with parties capable of contract-
ing, although such an agreement would have been on my part, from the
nature of my official duties, impossible. The world knows that I have
never sent any re-enforcements to the forts in Charleston Harbor, and I
have certainly never authorized any change to be made “in their rela-
tive military status.”
...
Under these circumstances it is clear that Major Anderson acted upon his own
responsibility, and without authority, unless, indeed, he had “tangible
evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act" on the part of the au-
thorities of South Carolina, which has not yet been alleged. Still, he is
a brave and honorable officer, and justice requires that he should not be
condemned without a fair hearing
____________________________
It was a political tool to stir up opposition to the secessionist movement. Taxes were a smoke screen put up by Lincoln.
In Texas, which from what I understand from the O.R. had the largest active operational collection of United States troops in any state, due to the border which Mexico and Indian raids. A total of over 2,600 troops, three regiments of infantry and one of cavalry with a few artillery companies. The following list of Federal installations were abandoned by those forces.
Camp Cooper
Camp Colorado
Ringgold Barracks
Camp Verde
Fort McIntosh
Fort Inge
Fort Lancaster
Fort Brown
Fort Duncan
Fort Chadbourne
Fort Mason
Fort Bliss
Fort Quitman
Fort Davis
Fort Stockton
The military Department of New Mexico was also abandoned.
Due to the amount of time for some of these units it took to leave the state a number were taken prisoners after Fort Sumter was fired upon. These were release by President Davis who recognized the earlier agreements.
Charleston was nothing compared to size of the turnover and military importance of these post.

Charleston was was not on the European trade route in 1860, that was reserved to ports farther north like New York and Boston. European trade first had to pass through those ports then transferred to Charleston and parts south. One of the big problems the South had with the trade arrangements. This is from the steamship records found on the New York Times archives from that year.
*************************************************************

First of all South Carolina was the first state to secede so the attention was there and where the federal installation were located in the summer of 1860.
I believe that Buchanan's people were afraid that if Charleston and South Carolina were to be "let go", the first thing they would do would to make trade treaties with Europe. This would threaten a collision between the North and those countries in Europe who would come to South Carolina's aid to protect access to South Carolina's products. There was much talk of making Charleston a "port of entry" to Europe. This would put Charleston in direct competition with New York, although it could not out perform New York or Boston for many years if at all.

Lincoln had no real designs on holding on the Fort Sumter, his mind was on holding on to the South and how to get the South to act militarily in order to accomplish this. This is evident in how he planned to resupply the fort. Not with food but with arms and men; and then proceded to make it impossible for the plan to succeed and make it look like the South started the war.

South Carolina's problem was not with the forts as weapons of war but the fact they were occupied by foreign troops. If you will notice the Confederates in their negotiations with Anderson never demanded he surrender his command only that he evacuate the fort. Even after they fired upon him and he relented they never wanted to hold onto his command, they wanted his command on a ship northward bound. I always thought if it were possible the Charleston people would have let Anderson have his fort as long as he could take every brick of it with him north.
************************************************************
Fort Sumter, Charleston, S. C., December 27, 1860.
"My Dear Sir: I have only time to say that the movement of my command to this place was made on my own responsibility and not in obediance to orders from Washington. I did it because in my opinion it was the best way of preventing the shedding of blood. God grant that the existing condition of affairs may be adjusted without any resort to force."
Truly your friend, Robert Anderson.
The Hon. Robert N. Gourdin."

In another letter he states....
"No one will regret more deeply than I shall, should it prove true that the movement I have made has complicated rather than disembarrassed affairs."
Reading almost all of Anderson's communications that I can find during this period, he switches from patriotic belief in his act, to extreme doubt, to trying to prove to others it was the right thing to do after seeing the reaction from the people of Charleston. He never proved he was going to be attacked. I believe Anderson was not a sound minded man. He only lasted another year or so after losing Fort Sumter and seeing the war it brought about, he eventually had to go on medical leave.

*************************************************************AUGUSTA ARSENAL, GA., January 24, 1861.
Sin: I have the honur to report that the arsenal was surrendered this
morning to the governor of Georgia upon honorable terms, herewith in-
closed.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
ARNOLD ELZEY
Captain, Second ~Artillery.
Col. S. COOPER, Adjutant-General U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.
[linclosure.]
AUGUSTA ARSENAL, GA., January 24, 1861.
His excellency the governor of Georgia having demanded the United
States Arsenal at Augusta, commanded-by Capt. Arnold Elzey, Second
Artillery, U. S. Army, the following terms are agreed upon, to wit.:
1st. The flag to le saluted and lowered by the United States troops.
2d. The company to be marched out with military honors and to re-
tain its arms and company property.
3d. The officers and soldiers to occupy quarters until removed beyond
the limits of the State, and to have the use of the post transportation to
and from the city and in the neighborhood, and the privilege of obtain-
ing supplies from the city.
4th. The public property to be receipted for hy the State authorities
and accounted for upon adjustment between the State of Georgia and
the United States of America.
5th. The troops to have unobstructed passage through and out of the
State, by water, to New York, via Savannah.
JOSEPH E. BROWN,
Governor and 6~ommander.in-Cidef of the Army of the State of Georgia.
ARNOLD ELZEY,
Captain, Second Artillery, Commanding Augusta Arsenal.
********************************************************* http://history-sites.com/cgi-bin/bbs53x/nvcwmb/webbbs_config.pl?read=61609
The United States Arsenal at Little Rock, Arkansas was commanded by Capt. James Totten. It was lay siege by Arkansas Militia under the command of Maj. Gen. James Yell and surrendered by Capt. Totten to the Govenor of the State Henry M. Rector, on Feb 6th, 1861, three months before Arkansas seceeded, on May 6th, 1861, from the Union AFTER Lincoln's call for 75,000 volunteers to fight against the southern states.
Capt. Totten's heritage, was that he was born in Pittsburg, Penn. 11 September, 1818 ; died in Sedalia, Missouri, 1 October, 1871. He was graduated at the United States military academy in 1841, became 1st lieutenant in 1847, engaged in the Florida war against the Seminole Indians in 1849-'50, and became captain in 1855. He aided in quelling the Kansas disturbances in 1857-'8, and in expelling intruders from the Indian reserves in Kansas and Arkansas in 1860. After his surrender of the Little Rock, Arsenal, He remained loyal to the Union and served during the War in Missouri under General Lyons and rose to the rank of Brig. General. Certainly he was NOT a southerner in command of this Arsenal.
In this surrender Govenor Rector assured Capt Totten that he would be personally responcible, as Govenor, for the United States Property in the Arsenal until Arkansas came to a decision on its official status. There were in fact three secession Conventions held in Arkansas, from January to May 1861. The result of the first two Convention were solidly in favor of remaining in the Union. It wasn't until war was certain, that Lincoln was going to use force rather than deplomacy to settle the southern states question, that the scales tipped to the other side.
In April 4th, 1861, local militia at Pine Bluff, in Jefferson County, Arkansas again under the command of Maj. Gen James Yell, Arkansas State Militia, stopped Steamboats on the Arkansas River to inspect and sieze U.S. Government stores being shipped to the U.S. garrison at Fort Smith, Arkansas. Again Governor Rector ordered that all Government store be held and secured by county officials, until a decision was made. This seizing of government stores at Pine Bluff was done in responce to military stores of Artillery, bought by the people of Pine Bluff, being siezed at Cincinnate, Ohio the previous month, March 1861.
All of this while Arkansas was still "Officially" a state in the Union of United States, and had said that it intended to remain so by the vote of TWO Secession Conventions.
I know that this all has very little to do with your quest for arsenal information, But I am simply pointing out that this thing of seizure or securing of Arsenal, military stores and goods was being carried on by both side. And was not as simple as we are lead to believe by general history books and newspaper articles.
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First of all Arkansas was NOT a "Confederate States" when it siezed the United States Arsenal at Little Rock. Arkansas had not seceeded at the time and had not held a secession convention, or referendum. The first Secession Convention was not held until March 4th, 1861, a month after the siezure of the Arsenal and secession was voted down at that time.
No Action was taken by the United States Government against the State of Arkansas for siezing that Arsenal and forcing Capt Totten to surrender custody of the arsenal. Now that may be a minor point to some people, BUT Arkansas for 3 months after that incident was STILL a State within the United States, therefore it was technically a "Northern" State until it seceeded.
In other word it was Legal for Arkansas to sieze the federal arsenal at Little Rock, while in South Carolina it was not legal to sieze the arsenal at Charleston.
Now did Arkansas eventually become a Confederate State?
YES it did. But that is hindsight judgement, on our part, and is incorrect, given the turmoil of the time, to say that Arkansas was going to become a Confederate State in February 1861. It had the lower Slave ration of any of the Southern states that did join the Confederacy at only 20% of it population. And Slave ownership was even a smaller percentage. Almost all of the slave owners lived along the lower Arkansas and Mississippi River valleys and the remained of the state were non slave owners. In fact the Delta counties of Arkansas threaten to seceed from the remainder of the State when the first secession convention failed to pass an Ordaince of Secession. Even as late as May of 1862 the Governor of Arkansas sent a letter to Jefferson davis threatening to Seceed from the Confederacy and become a Neutral state to both side if the Richmond Government did not defend the Confederate States west of the Mississippi River particularly Arkansas.
Do you think that the United States Government would have reconized that Neutrality?
Second, remember I also, maybe not very clearly, mentioned that the Government of the State of Ohio, in Cincinnate, siezed, in March, artillery which was being shipped to Pine Bluff, which had been purchased and manufacture prior to any hostilities, prior to Arkansas seceeding, while Arkansas was still officially a state within the United States.
So all of this siezing and counter siezing of Military goods was going on before Arkansas ever became a part of the Confederacy. Therefore it was going on within the United States without United States Government interference. It is one thing to declare your self independent from the Federal government and then take control of foriegn property within your state borders. But quite another to sieze control of Government property, while you are still a part of that Governemnts country,
In the case of Arkansas, they definately got the cart before the horse. And the United States Government did nothing to settle the situation like sending federa troops back to Little Rock to retake control of federal property within United States borders.
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http://history-sites.com/cgi-bin/bbs53x/nvcwmb/webbbs_config.pl?rev=61507

U. S. TRANSPORT ATLANTIC,
[New York,] April 6, 1861- 2.30 p. m.
Hon. WM. H. SEWARD, Secretary of State:
DEAR SIR: By great exertions, within less than six days from the
time the subject was broached in the office of the President, a war steamer sails from this port; and the Atlantic, built under contract to be at the service of the United States in case of war, will follow this afternoon with 500 troops, of which one company is sappers and miners, one a mounted battery. The Illinois will follow on Monday with the stores which the Atlantic could not hold.
While the mere throwing of a few men into Fort Pickens may seem a small operation, the opening of a campaign is a great one.
Unless this movement is supported by ample supplies and followed up by the Navy it will be a failure. This is the beginning of the war which every statesman and soldier has foreseen since the passage of the South Carolina ordinance of secession. You will find the Army and the Navy clogged at the head with men, excellent patriotic men, men who were soldiers and sailors forty years ago, but who now merely keep active men out of the places in which they could serve the country.
If you call out volunteers you have no general to command. The general born, not made, is yet to be found who is to govern the great army which is to save the country, if saved it can be. Colonel Keyes has shown intelligence, zeal, activity, and I look for a high future for him.
England took six months to get a soldier to the Crimea. We were from May to September in getting General Taylor before Monterey. Let us be supported; we go to serve our country, and our country should not neglect us or leave us to be strangled in tape, however red.
Respectfully,
M. C. MEIGS.
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http://history-sites.com/cgi-bin/bbs53x/nvcwmb/webbbs_config.pl?read=61730

Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress. Transcribed and Annotated by the Lincoln Studies Center, Knox College. Galesburg, Illinois.
Abraham Lincoln to William H. Seward, Monday, April 01, 1861 (Reply to Seward's “Some Thoughts for the President's Consideration")
From Abraham Lincoln to William H. Seward1, April 1, 1861
Executive Mansion
April 1, 1861
My dear Sir:
Since parting with you I have been considering your paper dated this day, and entitled "Some thoughts for the President's consideration"-- The first proposition in it is, "1st We are at the end of a month's administration, and yet without a policy, either domestic or foreign"--
At the beginning of that month, in the inaugural, I said "The power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy and possess the property and places belonging to the government, and to collect the duties, and imposts". This had your distinct approval at the time; and, taken in connection with the order I immediately gave General Scott, directing him to employ every means in his power to strengthen and hold the forts, comprises the exact domestic policy you now urge, with the single exception, that it does not propose to abandon Fort Sumpter--
Again, I do not perceive how the re-inforcement of Fort Sumpter would be done on a slavery, or party issue, while that of Fort Pickens would be on a more national, and patriotic one.
The news received yesterday in regard to St. Domingo,2 certainly brings a new item into within the range of our foreign policy; but up to that time we have been preparing circulars, and instructions to ministers, and the like, all in perfect harmony, without ever a suggestion that we had no foreign policy.
Upon your closing proposition, that "whatever policy we adopt, there must be an energetic prossecution of it"
"For this purpose it must be somebody's business to pursue and direct it incessantly"
"Either the President must do it himself, and be all the while active in it, or"
"Devolve it on some member of his cabinet"
"Once adopted, debates on it must end, and all agree and abide" I remark that if this must be done, I must do it-- When a general line of policy is adopted, I apprehend there is no danger of its being changed without good reason, or continuing to be a subject of unnecessary debate; still, upon points arising in its progress, I wish, and suppose I am entitled to have the advice of all the Cabinet--
Your Obt. Servt.
A. Lincoln
[ Endorsed on Envelope by Lincoln:]
Hon. W. H. Seward
Present
[Note 1 On March 28 General Scott informed Secretary of War Cameron that the evacuation of both Fort Sumter and Fort Pickens at Pensacola would be necessary to prevent the eight remaining slave states from seceding from the Union. Lincoln, shocked and dismayed, queried his cabinet the following day about the advisability of relieving the forts. Despite Scott's warning, a cabinet majority approved their being provisioned, over the objection of Secretary of State Seward, who would only recommend the relief of Fort Pickens. Lincoln thus concluded to call for an expedition to relieve Fort Sumter, to depart no later than April 6.
Seward, still hoping that the secession crisis could be solved through negotiation and resenting his defeat in the cabinet, delivered a memorandum to Lincoln which in effect called for a change in administration policy. See Seward to Lincoln, April 1, 1861. The memorandum asserted that the administration was in fact thus far without policy, domestic or foreign. Occupying or evacuating Fort Sumter had become a partisan question, when patriotism should instead be the major concern of the American people. Fort Sumter should be evacuated (though Pickens should be held) "as a safe means of changing the issue," with union or disunion then becoming the basis of a policy. And to bring this about public interest should be diverted to foreign policy, focusing on French and Spanish incursions in the Western Hemisphere and the seemingly unfriendly attitude of Great Britain. But "whatever policy we adopt," Seward wrote, "there must be an energetic prosecution of it." Suggesting that Lincoln had been deficient in that prosecution, Seward wrote that policy making and execution should be taken on either by the president or by some member of his cabinet. "It is not in my special province." he wrote. "But I neither seek to evade nor assume responsibility."
It is to that extraordinary note that Lincoln replies here.]
[Note 2 Spanish troops from Cuba had intervened in a rebellion in Santo Domingo.]

http://history-sites.com/cgi-bin/bbs53x/nvcwmb/webbbs_config.pl?rev=61753
There was a lot of preplanning, sort of 'just in case' going on. The war itself came as no real surprise to any of those in the 'know' in DC.
The Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress
Winfield Scott to John B. Floyd, Friday, December 28, 1860 (Forts in the South)
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Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress. Transcribed and Annotated by the Lincoln Studies Center, Knox College. Galesburg, Illinois.
Winfield Scott to John B. Floyd, Friday, December 28, 1860 (Forts in the South)
From Winfield Scott to John B. Floyd, December 28, 1860
Copy)
Lieut. Genl. Scott (who has had a bad night and can scarcely hold up his head this morning) begs to express the hopes to the Secretary of War -- 1. That orders may not be given for the evacuation of Fort Sumter; 2. That 150 recruits may instantly be sent from Governor's Island to re-inforce that Garrison with ample supplies of ammunition & subsistence, including fresh vegetables, as potatoes, onions, turnips, & 3. That one or two armed vessels be sent to support the said Fort
Lieut. Genl. S. avails himself of this opportunity also to express the hope that the recommendations heretofore made by him, to the Secretary of War, respecting Forts Jackson, St. Philipe, Morgan & Pulaski, & particularly in respect to Forts Pickens & McRee & the Pensacola Navy yard in connection with the last two named works -- may be re-considered by the secretary.
Lieut General S. will further ask the attention of the secretary to Forts Jefferson (on the Tortugas) & Taylor (on Key West.) which are wholly national -- being of far greater value even to the most distant points of the Atlantic coast & the people on the upper waters of the Missouri, Mississippi & Ohio rivers, than to the state of Florida. There is only a feeble company at Key West (Ft. Taylor) for the defence of Fort Taylor, and not a soldier in Fort Jefferson to resist a handful of fillibusters, or a row-boat of Pirates, and the gulf soon after the beginning of secession or revolutionary troubles in the adjacent states, will swarm with such nuisances.
Respectfully submitted to the Secretary of War.
Head Qrs. of the Army
Washington Dec. 28. 1860
Winfield Scott
X I am again (Jan. 4) urging, backed by Secretary Holt,1 that a sloop of war, lying near Norfolk, Va., be sent at once to protect those forts, but there is danger that secessionists will anticipate the arrival of the sloop of war. If not too late, I shall send a company (permission this day obtained) to Fort Jefferson (Tortugas) from Boston.
W. S.
Jan. 2.
[Note 1 ID: Joseph Holt, who had been Postmaster General in the Buchanan cabinet since 1859, replaced John Floyd as Secretary of War in January 1861. Holt won widespread praise throughout the North for his firmness in attempting to deal with secession. After Lincoln assumed the presidency, Holt became very active in a campaign to prevent his native state of Kentucky from seceding. Lincoln was impressed with Holt's activities on behalf of the Union and appointed him to investigate military contracts. In 1862, Lincoln appointed Holt Judge Advocate General of the Army. In this capacity Holt investigated the alleged existence of secret organizations in the North that were devoted to the Confederacy. Holt also served as a prosecutor in the trial of the Lincoln assassins and was convinced the assassination was part of a Confederate conspiracy.]




Interesting take on the situation and advice from Seward.
Pam
The Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress
William H. Seward to Abraham Lincoln, Friday, March 15, 1861 (Report on Fort Sumter)
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http://history-sites.com/cgi-bin/bbs53x/nvcwmb/webbbs_config.pl?rev=61755

Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress. Transcribed and Annotated by the Lincoln Studies Center, Knox College. Galesburg, Illinois.
William H. Seward to Abraham Lincoln, Friday, March 15, 1861 (Report on Fort Sumter)
From William H. Seward to Abraham Lincoln, March 15, 1861
Department of State
Washington, 15th March, 1861.
The President submits to me the following question, namely, "Assuming it to be possible to now provision Fort Sumter, under all the circumstances, is it wise to attempt it?"
If it were possible to peacefully provision Fort Sumter, of course I should answer that it would be both unwise and inhuman not to attempt it. But the facts of the case are known to be, that the attempt must be made with the employment of a military and marine force, which would provoke combat, and probably initiate a civil war, which the Government of the United States would be committed to maintain through all changes to some definite conclusion.
History must record that a sectional party practically constituting a majority of the people of the fifteen Slave States, excited to a high state of jealous apprehension for the safety of life and property, by impassioned, though groundless appeals, went into the late election with a predetermined purpose, if unsuccessful at the polls, to raise the standard of secession immediately afterwards, and to separate the Slave States, or so many of them as could be detached from the Union, and to organize them in a new, distinct, and independent confederacy: that party was unsuccessful at the polls. In the frenzy which followed the announcement of their defeat, they put the machinery of the State Legislatures and conventions into motion, and within the period of three months, they have succeeded in obtaining ordinances of secession by which seven of the Slave States have seceded and organized a new Confederacy under the name of the Confederated States of America. These States finding a large number of the mints, customhouses, forts and arsenals of the United States situate within their limits, unoccupied, undefended, and virtually abandoned by the late Administration, have seized and appropriated them to their own use, and under the same circumstances have seized and appropriated to their own use, large amounts of money and other public property of the United States, found within their limits. The people of the other Slave States, divided and balancing between sympathy with the seceding slave States and loyalty to the Union, have been intensely excited, but, at the present moment, indicate a disposition to adhere to the Union, if nothing extraordinary shall occur to renew excitement and produce popular exasperation. This is the stage in this premeditated revolution, at which we now stand.
The opening of this painful controversy, at once raised the question whether it would be for the interest of the country to admit the projected dismemberment, with its consequent evils, or whether patriotism and humanity require that it shall be prevented. As a citizen, my own decision on this subject was promptly made, namely, that the Union is inestimable and even indispensable to the welfare and happiness of the whole country, and to the best interests of mankind. As a statesman in the public service, I have not hesitated to assume that the Federal government is committed to maintain preserve and defend the Union, peaceably if it can, forcibly if it must, to every extremity. Next to Disunion itself, I regard civil war as the most disastrous and deplorable of national calamities, and as the most uncertain and fearful of all remedies for political disorders. I have therefore made it the study and labor of the hour, how to save the Union from dismemberment by peaceful policy and without civil war.
Influenced by these sentiments, I have felt that it is exceedingly fortunate that, to a great extent, the Federal government occupies, thus far, not an aggressive attitude, but, practically, a defensive one, while the necessity for action, if civil war is to be initiated, falls on those who seek to dismember and subvert this Union.
It has seemed to me equally fortunate that the Disunionists are absolutely without any justification for their rash and desperate designs. The administration of the Government had been for a long time virtually in their own hands, and controlled and directed by themselves, when they began the work of revolution. They had therefore no other excuse than apprehension of oppression from the new and adverse administration which was about to come into power
It seemed to me farther, to be a matter of good fortune that the new and adverse administration must come in with both Houses of Congress containing majorities opposed to its policy, so that, even if it would, it could commit no wrong or injustice against the States which were being madly goaded into revolution. Under the circumstances, Disunion could have no better basis to stand upon than a blind unreasoning popular excitement, arising out of a simple and harmless disappointment in a Presidential election -- that excitement, if it should find no new aliment, must soon subside and leave Disunion without any real support. On the other hand, I have believed firmly that every where, even in South Carolina, devotion to the Union is a profound and permanent national sentiment which, although it may be suppressed and silenced by terror for a time, could, if encouraged, be ultimately relied upon to rally the people of the seceding States to reverse, upon due deliberation, all the popular acts of legislatures and Conventions by which they were hastily and violently committed to Disunion.
The policy of the time, therefore, has seemed to me to consist in conciliation, which should deny to the Disunionists any new provocation or apparent offence, while it would enable the Unionists in the slave states to maintain, with truth and with effect, that the claims and apprehensions put forth by the Disunionists, are groundless and false.
I have not been ignorant of the objection that the Administration was elected through the activity of the Republican party, that it must continue to deserve and retain the confidence of that party while conciliation towards the Slave States tends to demoralize the Republican party itself, on which party the main responsibility of maintaining the Union must rest.
But it has seemed to me a sufficient answer first, that the Administration could not demoralize the Republican party without making some sacrifice of its essential principles when no such sacrifice is necessary or is any where authoritatively proposed; and secondly, if it be indeed true that pacification is necessary to prevent dismemberment of the Union and civil war, or either of them, no patriot and lover of humanity could hesitate to surrender party for the higher interests of country and humanity.
Partly by design, partly by chance, this policy has been hitherto pursued by the last Administration of the Federal government and by the Republican party in its corporate action. It is by this policy thus pursued, I think, that the progress of dismemberment has been arrested after the seven Gulf States had seceded, and the Border States yet remain, although they do so uneasily, in the Union.
It is to a perseverance in this policy for a short time longer that I look as the only peaceful means of assuring the continuance of Virginia, Maryland, North Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri and Arkansas, or most of those States, in the Union. It is through their good and patriotic offices that I look to see the Union sentiment revived and brought once more into activity in the seceding States, and through this agency those states themselves returning into the Union.
I am not unaware that I am conceding more than can reasonably be demanded by the people of the Border States. They could, speaking justly, demand nothing. They are bound by the federal obligation to adhere to the Union without concession or conciliation just as much as the people of the Free States are. But in administration we must deal with men, facts and circumstances not as they ought to be, but as they are.
The fact then is that while the people of the Border States desire to be loyal, they are at the same time sadly though temporarily demoralized by a sympathy for the Slave States which makes them forget their loyalty whenever there are any grounds for apprehending that the Federal Government will resort to military coercion against the seceding States, even though such coercion should be necessary to maintain the authority or even the integrity of the Union. This sympathy is unreasonable, unwise and dangerous, and therefore cannot, if left undisturbed, be permanent. It can be banished, however, only in one way, and that is by giving time for it to wear out and for reason to resume its sway. Time will do this, if it be not hindered by new alarms and provocations.
South Carolina opened the revolution Apprehending chastisement by the military arm of the United States, she seized all the Forts of the United States in the harbor of Charleston, except Fort Sumter, which, garrisoned by less than one hundred men, stands practically in a state of siege, but at the same time defying South Carolina and, as the seceding States imagine, menacing her with conquest. Every one knows, first, that even if Sumter were adequately reinforced, it would still be practically useless to the Government, because the administration in no case could attempt to subjugate Charleston or the State of South Carolina.
It is held now only because it is the property of the Unitded States and is a monument of their authority and sovereignty. I would so continue to hold it so long as it can be done without involving some danger or evil greater than the advantage of continued possession. The highest military authority tells us that without supplies the garrison must yield in a few days to starvation, that its numbers are so small that it must yield in a few days to attack by the assailants lying around it, and that the case in this respect would remain the same even if it were supplied but not reinforced. All the military and naval authorities tell us, that any attempt at supplies would be unavailing without the employment of armed military and naval force. If we employ armed force for the purpose of supplying the fort, we give all the provocation that could be offered by combining reinforcement with supply.
The question submitted to me then, practically, is, Supposing it to be possible to reinforce and supply Fort Sumter, is it wise now to attempt it, instead of withdrawing the garrison. The most that could be done by any means now in our hands, would be to throw 250 to 400 men into the garrison with provisions for supplying it for six months. In this active and enlightened country, in this season of excitement with a daily press, daily mails and incessantly operating telegraph, the design to reinforce and supply the garrison must become known to the opposite party at Charleston as soon, at least, as preparation for it should begin. The garrison would then almost certainly fall by assault before the expedition could reach the harbor of Charleston. But supposing the secret kept, the expedition must engage in conflict on entering the harbor of Charleston, suppose it to be overpowered and destroyed, is that new outrage to be avenged or are we then to return to our attitude of immobility? Shall we be allowed to do so? Moreover, in that event, what becomes of the garrison?
Suppose the expedition successful-- We have then a garrison in Fort Sumter that can defy assault for six months. What is it to do then? Is it to make war by opening its batteries and attempting to demolish the defences of the Carolinians? Can it demolish them if it tries? If it cannot, what is the advantage we shall have gained? If it can, how will it serve to check or prevent Disunion? In either case, it seems to me that we will have inaugurated a civil war by our own act, without an adequate object, after which reunion will be hopeless, at least under this administration, or in any other way than by a popular disavowal, both of the war and of the administration which unnecessarily commenced it. Fraternity is the element of Union. War the very element of disunion. Fraternity, if practiced by this administration, will rescue the Union from all its dangers. If this administration, on the other hand, take up the sword, then an opposition party will offer the olive branch and will, as it ought, profit by the restoration of peace and Union.
I may be asked, whether I would in no case and at no time, advise force -- whether I propose to give up everything. I reply, no, I would not initiate a war to regain a useless and unnecessary position on the soil of the seceding States. I would not provoke war in any way now. I would resort to force to protect the collection of the revenue, because this is a necessary as well as a legitimate union object. Even then, it should be only a naval force that I would employ, for that necessary purpose-- While I would defer military action on land until a case should arise when we would hold the defence. In that case, we should have the spirit of the country and the approval of mankind on our side. In the other, we should peril peace and Union, because we had not the courage to practice prudence and moderation at the cost of temporary misapprehension. If this counsel seems to be impassive and even unpatriotic, I console myself by the reflection that it is such as Chatham gave to his country under circumstances not widely different.
William H. Seward
http://history-sites.com/cgi-bin/bbs53x/nvcwmb/webbbs_config.pl?read=61852

In doing a ‘quick’ search trying to find the dates that various arsenals came into Confederate hands I discovered some interesting stuff.
So far, those in Confederate hands before the shots fired at Sumter are:
Mount Vernon, Al. Jan.4, 1861. Taken by Gracie. Now there is a State Mental Hospital on the site.
Apalachicola, Fl. (really in Chattahoochee) taken Jan.6, 1861. Is the site of the State Mental Hospital.
Baton Rouge, La. Jan.26, 1861
San Antonio, Texas Feb.16, 1861
Little Rock, Ark. Feb.6, 1861
Nashville, Tenn. 1861
Now, the reason I started this research stuff is all about one man. F. C. Humphreys. This is where it gets interesting.
Charleston Arsenal, Dec. 30, 1860. Surrendered by F.C. Humphrey’s.
Augusta Ga. Arsenal, Jan.24, 1861. Surrendered by F.C. Humphrey’s and it gets deeper.
F.C. Humphrey’s enlisted in the Confederate Army and became the commander at the Colombus Arsenal.
http://www.gavolbn.org/ColumbusArsenal.html
http://www.aug.edu/~liblsc/Grant/Pfadenhauer/Arsenal_description.html
So all I can figure is, those states who had left the Union knew they needed the arsenals and took care of that right away.
What I find even stranger is that hubby has no memory of his family ever talking about his GGGrandfather’s war experience. That’s the real shame.
Pam
http://history-sites.com/cgi-bin/bbs53x/nvcwmb/webbbs_config.pl?read=61871
The Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress
Joseph Holt to Abraham Lincoln, Saturday, March 09, 1861 (Shipment of munitions to seceded states cannot be prevented)
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Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress. Transcribed and Annotated by the Lincoln Studies Center, Knox College. Galesburg, Illinois.
Joseph Holt to Abraham Lincoln, Saturday, March 09, 1861 (Shipment of munitions to seceded states cannot be prevented)

From Joseph Holt to Abraham Lincoln, March 9, 1861
War Department
March 9th 1861
Sir.
In reference to the Telegraphic dispatch just submitted for my consideration, I have the honor to state that under existing laws, this Department has no power, -- nor has the government any -- to prevent the shipment of munitions of war to the seceding states. The matter was pressed upon the attention of the military committee during the late session of Congress, but resulted in no action, I believe, on its part.
Very respectfully
Your obt servt
J Holt
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The 3rd plank of the 1860 Republican party platform reads;
"3. That to the Union of the States this nation owes its unprecedented increase in population; its surprising development of material resources; its rapid augmentation of wealth; its happiness at home and its honor abroad; and we hold in abhorrence all schemes for disunion, come from whatever source they may; and we congratulate the country that no republican member of congress has uttered or countenanced the threats of disunion so often made by democratic members, without rebuke and with applause from their political associates; and we denounce those threats of disunion, in case of a popular overthrow of their ascendancy, as denying the vital principles of a free government, and as an avowal of contemplated treason, which it is the imperative duty of an indignant people sternly to rebuke and forever silence."
This would seem to indicate that the threat of Secession was a "National" issue, that it was being openly discussed well before the 1860 election, for it to be included as a party position during the Republican Convention.

We know that South Carolina threaten secession IF Lincoln was elected. Everyone assumes that this was over the slavery issue. But when Fort Sumter was fired upon the Northern rally cry was to "Preserve the Union". Freeing the Slaves as we know did not become a War aim until later in the war, when the Northern people grew weary of the War to preserve the Union.

I really haven't heard or read very much on the secession debate that must have been going on in the late 1850's. So, was the right of Secession, and the threat to exercise that state right, really the 'true cause' of the War for Southern Independence?

To what extent was secession threaten? We know that South Carolina made such a declaration and carried through with their promise to seceed. But did other southern state prior to events of 1861 make the same decalration that they would also seceed? Was this "national issue" of secession limited to only one states threat to seceed?
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http://history-sites.com/cgi-bin/bbs53x/nvcwmb/webbbs_config.pl?read=61869

Disunion means the breakup of the union or the secession of several states.
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January 16, 1857
A disunion convention assembled at Worcester, Massachusetts, at which the following resolutions were passed:

“Resolved, That the meeting of a State disunion convention, attended by men of various parti

[ Edited Thu Jun 22 2017, 06:02PM ]
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gpthelastrebel
Thu Jun 22 2017, 05:40PM

Registered Member #1
Joined: Tue Jul 17 2007, 02:46PM
Posts: 3698
While doing some online research I found this website. I haven't read each article so I will reserve any comments until later.

https://www.nps.gov/fosu/learn/historyculture/fosu_docs.htm

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